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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 JEHIEL PENA ESTRADA, 
                             Appellant  
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
District Court No. 3-19-cr-00063-001 
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on December 7, 2020 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 






SMITH, Chief Judge.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 





 Jehiel Pena Estrada was charged with possession of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 844(a).  After the District Court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, he 
pleaded guilty to the charge.  Because the District Court did not clearly err in 
finding that Estrada consented to the search that led to the discovery of the cocaine, 
we will affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. 
I. 
 The District Court held a hearing on Estrada’s motion to suppress on 
December 2, 2019.  Because we write for the parties, we briefly summarize only 
the evidence most relevant to our disposition. 
Just after midnight on September 17, 2019, Estrada and another individual, 
Billy Iglesias, arrived by boat in St. Thomas’s Crown Bay Marina.  Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) agents Carlton Evans and Kevin Florence, who had been 
tracking the arrival of the boat, encountered Estrada and Iglesias in the marina 
parking lot.  According to the CBP agents, Evans approached and spoke to Estrada 
and Iglesias, but Estrada indicated that he did not understand English.  Because 
Florence had a better knowledge of Spanish than Evans, Florence asked Estrada in 
Spanish for permission to search the boat and his person.  Estrada responded “sí” 
(yes).   
Evans then walked over to Iglesias, at which time he observed a vacuum-




evidence of this nature can be indicative of illegal activity, Evans handcuffed 
Iglesias and searched him.  Evans told Florence to handcuff Estrada, which he did.  
Florence then searched Estrada and found two baggies containing cocaine in his 
pockets.   
It was undisputed that the CBP agents kept their hands on or near their 
weapons during the encounter, but never unholstered the weapons.  The agents 
testified that they neither touched Estrada nor ordered him to do anything during 
the encounter.  They also testified that their voices were calm and non-
confrontational.  Estrada, in contrast, testified that the agents yelled at him in 
English and one agent placed a hand on him.  He testified that he did not 
understand anything the agents said to him and was never asked in Spanish 
whether he consented to a search.   
The District Court denied Estrada’s suppression motion from the bench.  It 
found that Estrada voluntarily consented to the search, and that the agents’ 
placement of their hands on their weapons did not undermine the voluntariness of 
the consent.  The District Court also determined that the decision to handcuff 
Estrada after he provided consent did not negate that consent.   
Estrada ultimately pleaded guilty, reserving the right to challenge on appeal 





A District Court’s determination of consent is a finding of fact subject to 
clear error review.  United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 954–55 (3d Cir. 1994).  A factual finding is 
clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the 
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States v. 
Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 
270, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2003)).    
III. 
Estrada contends that the District Court’s consent finding is clearly 
erroneous because: (1) the CBP agents did not communicate with him in Spanish; 
and (2) he was subjected to a show of force that undermined the voluntariness of 
any consent he might have appeared to give.2  We are not persuaded. 
Although its discussion was relatively brief, it is apparent that the District 
Court considered the totality of the circumstances and credited the agents’ version 
of events in which Estrada was asked in Spanish to consent to the search and 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612 and 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 According to Estrada, the agents yelled, wore camouflage, kept their hands on 
their weapons, and did not read him the Miranda warnings or tell him he was free 
to leave.  The only fact disputed at the hearing was whether the agents yelled; all of 




Estrada voluntarily and without coercion provided such consent.  After considering 
Estrada’s arguments and reviewing the record as a whole, we are not left with the 
“definite and firm conviction” that the District Court’s consent finding was 
erroneous.  See Lowe, 791 F.3d at 427.  Accordingly, we will uphold that finding. 
III. 
Because our decision concerning consent is determinative, we need not 
reach Estrada’s remaining arguments.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence.  Because no other 
issues were appealed, the conviction and sentence will be affirmed. 
